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1. Introduction
We are witnesses to both an intense debate over copyrights and
patents and a general agreement that some special kind of legal
protection is needed to secure for inventors and creators the fruits
of their labor. For all the emotion, it seems both those in favor of
strengthening and weakening existing protection agree that
intellectual property laws need to strike a balance between
providing sufficient incentive for creation and the freedom to make
use of existing ideas. Put it differently, both sides agree that
intellectual property rights are a “necessary evil” that fosters
innovation, and disagreement is over where the line should be
drawn. For the supporters of intellectual property, current
monopoly profits are barely enough; for its enemies currently
monopoly profits are too high. In fact, one is tempted to say, for
many “enemies” of intellectual property, profits are always too
high as long as they are positive.
In our recent book Against Intellectual Monopoly we reach
conclusions that are at variance with both sides. We are not of the
view that innovators should work out of benevolence. Certainly
few people do something in exchange for nothing. Creators of new
goods are not different from producers of old ones: they want to be
compensated for their effort. However, it is a long and dangerous
jump from the assertion that innovators deserve compensation for
                                                
1 Based on our book Against Intellectual Monopoly and on the papers presented
and the discussions that took place at the WUStL Law School Conference, in
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their efforts to the conclusion that patents and copyrights, that is
monopoly, are a good way of providing that reward. Since
innovators may be rewarded even without patents and copyright,
we should ask: is it true that intellectual property achieves the
intended purpose of creating incentives for innovation and creation
that offset its considerable harm?
There are three broad types of intellectual property
recognized in most legal systems: patents, copyrights and
trademarks. Trademarks are different in nature than patents and
copyrights: they serve to identify the providers of goods, services
or ideas. Copying or imitating – which would be violations of
either copyright or patents – are quite different from lying – which
would be a violation of trademark. We do not know of a good
reason for allowing market participants to steal identities or
masquerade as people they are not. Conversely, there are strong
economic advantages in allowing market participants to voluntarily
identify themselves. While we may wonder if it is necessary to
allow the Intel Corporation a monopoly over the use of the word
“inside,” in general there is little economic dispute over the merits
of trademarks. We focus, therefore, on patents and copyrights and
to these two set of legally protected rights we refer when we use
the terms “Intellectual Property” and “Intellectual Monopoly”.
Some critics, both at this conference and elsewhere, have
argued that the term “monopoly” in this case is too strong. Charles
McManus, for example, argues in his contribution to this volume
that the term is too strong when applied to copyright because the
latter seeks to protect “expression” of ideas, not the idea being
expressed. Maybe it is too strong, but, in the English vocabulary,
we cannot find a better term describing a legal right that allows
sellers of, say, books to determine what lawful buyers of their
product are allowed to do with it. In particular, how else to define
the following facts, if not as an exercise of a monopoly power?
Publishers of academic journals can prevent the original authors of
the articles published in the journal from circulating copies of the
same, even for free. Citations from books, or music, or movies that
were legally purchased cannot be longer than a few lines or
seconds without additional payments to the original publisher,
even if such citations are obtained through legal and widely
available technologies.  As a third, dramatic, example consider the
recent Google Books or Google Prints disaster, in which publishers
of books that had been legally purchased, at library rates, by
libraries around the world have successfully challenged the right of
such libraries to enter into cooperation with Google in order to2
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digitize those books and make them searchable and usable on line,
for free, through Google’s proprietary technology. Should we not
call this an exercise of “monopoly power”? Very well, what should
we call it, then? Maybe a crime against culture and the world
diffusion of knowledge?
Matter of fact a “monopoly” is, in economic parlance, the
exclusive right to sell/produce a certain object of service. The U.S.
Constitution allows Congress “To promote the progress of science
and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries.”
2 Our perspective on patents and copyright is a similar
one: From a social point of view, and in the view of the founding
fathers, the purpose of patents and copyrights is not to enrich the
few at the expense of the many. Nobody doubts that J. K. Rowling
and Bill Gates have been greatly enriched by their intellectual
property – nor is it surprising that they would argue in favor of it.
But common sense and the U.S. Constitution say that these rights
must be justified by bringing benefits to all of us.
The U.S. Constitution is explicit that what is to be given to
authors and inventors is an exclusive right – a monopoly. Implicit
is the idea that giving this monopoly serves to promote the
progress of science and useful arts. The U.S. Constitution was
written in 1787. At that time, the idea of copyright and patent was
relatively new, the products to which they applied few, and their
terms short. In light of the experience of the subsequent 219 years
we might ask: is it true that legal grants of monopoly serve to
promote the progress of science and the useful arts?
Common sense suggests that it could. How is a musician to
make a living if the moment she performs her music, everyone else
can copy and give it away for free? Why would the large
corporations pay the small inventor when they can simply take his
idea? Is not the explosion of creativity and invention unleashed
since the writing of the U.S. Constitution a testimony to the
powerful benefit of intellectual property? Would not the world
without patent and copyright be a sad cold world, empty of new
music and of marvelous new inventions? These are the very
practical questions our work tries to address.
We begin by asking: why should creators have the right to
control how purchasers make use of an idea or new good? This
                                                
2 U.S. Constitution Article 1, Section 8. The U.S. Constitution, not being
copyrighted, is online at various places, such as
http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution.3
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gives creators a monopoly over the idea. We refer to this right as
“intellectual monopoly,” to emphasize that it is this monopoly over
all copies of an idea that is controversial, not the right to buy and
sell copies. The government does not ordinarily enforce
monopolies for producers of other goods. This is because it is
widely recognized that monopoly creates many social costs.
Intellectual monopoly is no different in this respect. The question
we address is whether it also creates social benefits commensurate
with these social costs.
This may also be the appropriate point to discuss Mark
Lemley’s criticism, according to which “monopolistic
competition” is the rule of the game in almost every industry,
hence what difference does a patent or a copyright make? It makes
a big difference: in the market for shoes or bread competing firms
freely select where to position themselves. If one likes to position
very close or very far from its competitors, there is no legal
constraint to prevent such a choice from being implemented. When
patents and copyrights enter the scene the situation change: one
cannot choose to compete with our publisher by lawfully
purchasing a copy of our book, reproduce it with legal means and
try to sell it on the market. The world of free monopolistic
competition is an always changing one. The world of legal
monopoly is not, for two decades in the case of patents and for
pretty much ever in the case of copyrights. Thereby the qualitative
difference. Is it also quantitatively important? We believe it is, and
the whole book is practically dedicated to show by means of data
and facts that Intellectual Monopoly does make a, negative,
quantitative difference on our collective wellbeing. We may have
made the wrong calculations and we may have looked at the wrong
facts, but we need to be proved wrong with facts and data. Just
arguing that “cosi’ fan tutte” is not enough.
Recognize, first, that intellectual monopoly is a double-
edged sword. The existence of monopolies increases the cost of
creation. In one extreme case, a movie that cost $218 to make had
to pay $400,000 for the music rights.
3 In Against Intellectual
Monopoly we go through numerous examples of cases where far
from increasing innovation and creation, intellectual monopoly has
instead served to inhibit or prevent it. A brief list of examples is
instructive:
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￿  Boulton and Watt’s steam engine patent most likely delayed
the industrial revolution by a couple of decades.
￿  Selten’s automobile patent set back automobile innovation in
the United States by roughly the same amount of time.
￿  The Wright Brothers airplane patent forced innovative work on
airplane technology out of the United States to France.
￿  The patent system of England and France forced the chemical
industry to move to Germany and Switzerland, where chemical
patents did not exist or were much weaker.
￿  When Verdi gained copyright over his works he stopped
producing new works. More generally, there is no evidence
that the adoption of copyrights stimulated the creation of
classical music.
Given that we quoted the paradigmatic case of Boulton and
Watt, this may be a good place to address the criticisms that
George Selgin and John Turner have raised in a couple of
occasions against our interpretation of this specific story. We
should establish, first of all, that while some of the detailed facts
they correct us about are certainly the way they say, an equal
number of other are not. So, for example, Ed and William Bull
were father and son, and the latter continued the enterprise where
the first had left it. Similarly, Hornblower may or may not have
paid back huge amounts of royalties to B&W and may or may not
have been a poor businessman, but there is no doubt that B&W
actively used the legal system to prevent him from marketing his
own machine. The book also reports the correct statistics for
horsepower and engines installed, and we are grateful to Selgin
and Turner for pointing us to the more recent and more reliable
data, which we used and that yields the very same result. All these
details, at the end, do not change the two main facts upon which
our argument is founded: B&W’s patent allowed for a
monopolization of the English market for steam engines until
1800; the adoption of steam engines exploded only after the patent
expired, did so extremely rapidly and it was accompanied by
enormous efficiency gains that had been altogether absent during
the previous 25 years. We do not make any claim of originality
here, dozens of economic historians have argued one of these
points or all of them during the last few decades. Our contribution
was, purely, to put them together and point the finger to the likely
culprit: B&W’s patent. Where Selgin and Turner differ from us, at
the end, is on the interpretation of these facts. They see this as a
natural development and claim that the trajectory is exponential as5
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it should be, in their view. We see it differently and have argued
why in the book and elsewhere. This does not seem the place to
dwell back on the same set of issues.
Those listed earlier are not the only examples of patent-blocked
innovations and development, but are some of the most egregious.
In the opposite direction, our book reports numerous examples of
how innovation thrives without patents and copyright, and of the
various inimical effects of the monopoly wrought by intellectual
property. More importantly, we search the empirical literature long
and hard without finding a single case in which a strengthening of
intellectual monopoly un-controversially increased innovations.
We find that a strengthening of intellectual monopoly increases
patenting and copyright claims, but patents and copyright do not
increase actual innovation.
We are by no means the first economists to reach this
conclusion. After reviewing an earlier set of facts in 1958, the
distinguished economist Fritz Machlup wrote
“it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge
of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting [a patent
system].”
4
2. Does Intellectual Monopoly Increase Innovation?
Theory
From a theoretical point of view, intellectual monopoly
may both increase and decrease innovation: it provides more
revenues to those that innovate, but also makes innovation more
costly. Innovations generally build on existing innovations. While
each individual innovator may earn more if he has an intellectual
monopoly, he also faces a higher cost: he must pay off all those
other monopolists owning rights to existing innovations.
A number of economic historians, Douglass North and his
followers foremost among them, have argued that the great
acceleration in innovation and productivity we associate with the
Industrial Revolution was caused by the development of ways to
protect the right of inventors, allowing them to profit from their
innovations.
5 Central among such ways was the attribution of
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patent system. We discuss his position further in our conclusion.
5 A starting point for Douglass North’s views of the role that well defined
property rights, and patents in particular, played in the Industrial Revolution are
his works of 1981, and 1991. It should be noted that North does not subscribe to6
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patents to inventors, and their upholding either by Parliament or by
the courts. Relative to the very poorly defined contractual rights of
pre-seventeen century Europe, plagued by royal and aristocratic
abuses of property and contracts, there is no doubt that allowing
individuals a temporary but well defined monopoly over the fruits
of their inventive effort was a major step forward. Even
monopolistic property is much better than a system that allows
arbitrary seizure by the rich and powerful. This does not, however,
contradict our claim that widespread and ever growing
monopolistic rights are not as socially beneficial as well defined
competitive property rights.
To put it differently, about four centuries ago, as Western
societies moved away from post-medieval absolutist regimes, the
establishment of patents constituted a step forward for the creation
of a system of property rights that favored entrepreneurship and
free market interaction. By the force of the same reasoning, the
abolition of patents and of the distortionary monopolistic rights
they entail may well result, now, in an analogous boost to
entrepreneurial effort and free competition. The contribution that
the Neo-Institutional approach may still provide to this debate was
well discussed in the paper by Vertinsky, also in this volumen,
which raises a number of relevant issues we unfortunately cannot
address here. We would like, though, to point out one thing:
patents are by no means the only legal instruments allowing for
contractability of ideas and for the creation of a maket for
technology transfers. Beginning with the pathebreaking work of
Jack Hirshleifer in the early 1970s, it has become clear that
economically valuable information can be traded in the absence of
patents and under condition of competition or nearly so. There is
no prima facie evidence, either theoretical or empirical, for the
claim that the disappearance of patents would increase transaction
costs associated to technology transfer. Most likely, it will reduce
them insofar as it will reduce incentives for rent-seeking, defensive
patenting, submarine patenting and all the gigantic legal costs these
practices have brought upon us. In summary, well defined and
protected private property of own ideas does not require monopoly
                                                                                                            
a naïve view of the evolution of property rights according to which they become
progressively more “efficient” or just simply “better” as time goes on and the
economy develops. Being aware of the fact they are, more often than not,
determined by rent-seeking agents within a political game, North is careful at
pointing out that the system of property rights one often faces is substantially
inefficient or inefficiency-inducing along more than one dimension.7
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over them pretty much in the same way that private property of our
own cars does not require the two of us becoming the only
motorized citizens of the USA.
Theory also suggests that small countries with low IP
protection should witness a surge in the inflow of IP-related
investment after their IP protection is increased, as they capture
investments from other countries where intellectual monopoly is
protected less. The latter is a particular kind of “zero-sum game”
6
that, unfortunately, appears to have gone beyond a mere theoretical
possibility. What is less obvious, is what the outcome will be once
every country adopts the same high degree of IP protection. Leave
aside the more or less terrifying scenarios of escalation – in which
countries out-do each other trying to allure IP-related investments
by progressively increasing their local protection of intellectual
monopoly. It is still worth asking if a world where everyone has
the same degree of IP protection as, say, the US currently does is a
world with a higher or lower rate of innovation and a higher or
lower social welfare than a world with much less IP protection.
7
3. Does Intellectual Monopoly Increase Innovation?
Facts
Theory gives an ambiguous answer, so let us look at
evidence, supported by a bit of statistical common sense.
Given the continued extension of patent protection to new
areas – business practices and computer software, for example –
                                                
6 In fact, negative-sum insofar as it increases lobbying efforts and related
wasteful transaction costs.
7 Writing about the use of patents to lure investments away from other countries
tempted us to engage in a digression on the role that patents played in Europe,
roughly, between 1400 and 1800. Here are some hints for further reading. The
original purpose of patents was to attract specific groups of artisans and highly
skilled professionals that were, for a reason or another, lacking in the country or
city promising the patent. Monopoly was the carrot offered by most Italian and
Northern European cities to inventors that agreed to emigrate and set up shop
there. In England, during the seventeenth, eighteenth and most of the nineteenth
centuries a royal patent privilege was awarded to those citizens who would
travel abroad and be the first to bring back new goods and technologies. United
States patent laws were less inclined to provide incentives to pirate foreign
innovators, but it still discriminated heavily against foreign citizens and
innovations until the 1861 reform; pirating of foreign inventions, especially
British, was thriving. Notice the interesting fact: all these practices just
amounted to imitation, or piracy in modern jargon, rewarded with local
monopoly! This is something worth keeping in mind in the light of current
sermons against Indian, Chinese, Mexican and Brazilian people “pirating our
inventions.” Our reading of historical records is that all this “reciprocal stealing”
had no effect on the total amount of inventions.8
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one might hope that there is recent strong evidence that the
introduction of patent protection has lead to a substantial increase
in innovation. These hopes, alas, are not to be fulfilled: It is
already apparent that the recent explosion of patents in the U.S.,
the E.U. and Japan, has not brought about anything comparable in
terms of useful innovations and aggregate productivity. This we
asserted a few years ago, while writing the book, and it is readily
apparent today, in the midst of the Great Recession: the patents’
explosion, certainly, did not bring about any increase in aggregate
productivity.
While there is no hope of finding evidence supporting the
claim “more patents = higher productivity” in recent data, also the
historical evidence provides little or no support .
8
3.1 Copyright and Music in the 18
th Century
The effect of copyright is difficult to analyze because it is
hard to get reliable data prior to the 19
th century. Copyright was
already fairly ubiquitous across Europe early in the 19
th century,
and its term there has changed little since then.
The one exception turns out to be in the case of classical
music. Copyright was unknown in the world of music until around
the end of the 18
th century. As a result, a large proportion of
classical music, still today accounting for about 3% of all music
sales but, obviously, a much larger portion of music production
until late in the 19
th century, was produced without the benefit of
copyright protection.
Here is what Frederic Scherer, a strong supporter of
intellectual property, has to say about in his extensive study of
classical music:
The evolution of copyright from an occasional grant of
royal privilege to a formal and eventually widespread
                                                
8 To read more, a few good books to begin with are Epstein and Maarten [2005,
eds.], Khan [2005, Chapter 2], Landes [1969] and Landes [1998]. A recent and
fairly unbiased synthesis of the historical literature concerned with the impact of
patents on the Industrial Revolution and inventive activity during the 18
th and
19
th century, McLeod and Nuvolari [2006], concludes by saying
However, it would be wrong to assume that the emergence of patent systems
played a critical or determinant role in such a transition. The evidence
discussed in this paper has shown that the institutional arrangements supporting
inventive activities in this historical phase were extremely variegated and
sophisticated. […] In other words, the roots of western industrialization seem to
have been wider and deeper than the emergence of modern patent systems.9
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system of law should in principle have enhanced
composers’ income from publication. The evidence from
our quantitative comparison of honoraria received by
Beethoven, with no copyright law in his territory, and
Robert Schumann, benefiting from nearly universal
European copyright, provides at best questionable support
for the hypothesis that copyright fundamentally changed
composers’ fortunes. From the qualitative evidence on
Giuseppe Verdi, who was the first important composer to
experience the new Italian copyright regime and devise
strategies to derive maximum advantage, it is clear that
copyright could make a substantial difference. In the case
of Verdi, greater remuneration through full exploitation of
the copyright system led perceptibly to a lessening of
composing effort.
9
Professor Scherer also exploited the variations between
European countries copyright law regarding music to conduct a
third natural experiment. He compared the average number of
composers born per million population per decade in various
European countries. Turning first to England, he considers the
precopyright period 1700-1752, and the post copyright period
1767-1849. As controls he looks also at what happened in
Germany, Austria and Italy in which there was no change in
copyright during this period.
Pre Post Ratio
UK 0.348 0.140 0.40
Germany 0.493 0.361 0.73
Italy 0.527 0.186 0.35
Austria  0.713 0.678 0.95
We see that the number of composers per million declined
everywhere, but it declined considerably faster in the UK after the
introduction of copyright than in Germany or Austria, and at about
                                                
9 Scherer [2004] p.191. It should be apparent that everything we know about the
impact of copyright on classical music we have learned from Scherer [2004],
and his sources. An additional valuable reference for the details relative to the
extension of the Statute of Anne to musical compositions is Carroll [2005].10
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the same rate as Italy. So there is no evidence here that copyright
increased musical output.
However, the evidence is mixed, because the same
experiment in France is more favorable to copyright. In France the
precopyright period is 1700-1768, and the post copyright period is
1783-1849
Pre Post Ratio
France 0.126 0.194 1.54
Germany 0.527 0.340 0.65
Italy 0.587 0.153 0.31
Austria 0.847 0.740 0.86
Here we find that, in France, when copyright is introduced the
number of composers per million increased substantially more than
in other countries. This should be noted, as it is pretty much the
only piece of evidence supporting the idea that copyright increased
classical music production we have been capable of finding.
Looking more broadly at the entire European scene and at
the careers of comparable composers living with or without
copyright protection Scherer finds it difficult to conclude that
copyright law was a significant factor, either way, in determining
the amount of musical composition taking place. It may not have
reduced the incentive to compose music, but it certainly did not
increase it either: whatever the mechanism affecting composers’
incentives, copyright protection was not an important part of it.
3.2 Patents and Innovation in the 19
th Century
Kenneth Sokoloff, together with Naomi Lamoreaux and
Zorina Khan examined the role of patents in the U.S. in the 19
th
and early 20
th century. In 1836 the U.S.
instituted an examination system under which, before granting
patents, technical experts scrutinized applications for novelty
and for the appropriateness of claims about invention. This
procedure made patent rights more secure by increasing the
likelihood that a grant for a specified technology would survive
a court challenge, and may also have provided some signal
about the significance of the new technology. Thereafter, both
patenting and sales of patent rights boomed.
10
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The aim of this research is to show that the patent system
introduced in the U.S. after the 1830s created a well defined
market for patents and technologies that did not exist previously,
and that the creation of such a market led to an increase in the
number of patents registered and traded. It should be observed that
the institutional change that led to the booming of patenting and
the sales of patent rights was to make it more difficult to get
patents – quite the opposite of modern institutional changes. In
addition, while this research makes it clear that the number of
patent agents, and of inventors making use of their services,
boomed, they also document that an important portion of the
services was to assist inventors in getting patents, and in
navigating the thicket of existing patents – socially wasteful
activities that would be unnecessary in the absence of a patent
system.
One important difficulty is in determining the level of
innovative activity. One measure is the number of patents, of
course, but this is meaningless in a country that has no patents, or
when patent laws change. Petra Moser gets around this problem by
examining the catalogs of innovations from 19
th century World
Fairs. Of the catalogued innovations, some are patented, some are
not, some are from countries with patent systems, and some are
from countries without. Moser catalogues over 30,000 innovations
from a variety of industries.
Mid-nineteenth century Switzerland [a country without
patents], for example, had the second highest number of
exhibits per capita among all countries that visited the Crystal
Palace Exhibition. Moreover, exhibits from countries without
patent laws received disproportionate shares of medals for
outstanding innovations.
11
Moser does, however, find a significant impact of patent law on
the direction of innovation
The analysis of exhibition data suggests that patent laws may
be an important factor in determining the direction of
innovative activity. Exhibition data show that countries without
                                                                                                            
including the book by Khan [2005], which contains a large bibliography. On the
growth of intermediaries and their role see Lamoreaux and Sokoloff [2002].
11 Moser [2003], p. 3.12
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patents share an exceptionally strong focus on innovations in
two industries: scientific instruments and food processing. At
the Crystal Palace, every fourth exhibit from a country without
patent laws is a scientific instrument, while no more than one
seventh of other countries innovations belong to this category.
At the same time, the patentless countries have significantly
smaller shares of innovation in machinery, especially in
machinery for manufacturing and agricultural machinery.
After the Netherlands abolished her patent system in 1869 for
political reasons, the share of Dutch innovations that were
devoted to food processing increased from 11 to 37 percent.
12
Moser then goes on to say that
Nineteenth-century sources report that secrecy was
particularly effective at protecting innovations in scientific
instruments and in food processing. On the other hand,
patenting was essential to protect and motivate innovations in
machinery, especially for large-scale manufacturing.
13
It is interesting also that patent laws may reflect the state of
industry and innovation in a country
Anecdotal evidence for the late nineteenth and for the twentieth
century suggests that a country’s choice of patent laws was
often influenced by the nature of her technologies. In the
1880s, for example, two of Switzerland’s most important
industries chemicals and textiles were strongly opposed to the
introduction of a patent system, as it would restrict their use of
processes developed abroad.
14
More recent work by Moser,
15 exploiting the same data set
from two different angles, strengthens this finding – that is, that
patents did not increase the level of innovation. In her words:
“Comparisons between Britain and the United States suggest that
even the most fundamental differences in patent laws failed to raise
the proportion of patented innovations.”
16 Her work appears to
                                                
12 Ivi, p. 6.
13 Ivi, p. 6.
14 Moser [2003], pp. 34-35. Petra Moser’s dissertation, which won the 2003
Gerschenkron Prize awarded by the Economic History Association to the best
dissertation in the field, is a mine of valuable information on the role of patents
in determining innovative activity during the 19th and early 20th century. The
main findings are summarized in Moser [2003]
15  Moser [2005, 2006].
16 Moser [2006], Abstract.13
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confirm two of the stylized facts we often insist upon. First that, as
we just mentioned in discussing the work of Sokoloff, Lamoreaux
and Khan, innovations that are patented tend to be traded more
than those that are not, and therefore to disperse geographically
farther away from the original area of invention. Based on data for
the period 1841-1901, innovation for industries in which patents
are widely used is not higher but more dispersed geographically
than innovation in industries in which patents are not or scarcely
used. Second, when the “defensive patenting” motive is absent, as
it was in 1851, an extremely small percentage of inventors (less
than one in five) chooses patents as a method for maximizing
revenues and protect intellectual property.
Summing up: careful statistical analyses of the 19
th century’s
available data, carried out by distinguished economic historians,
uniformly shows two things. Patents neither increase the rate of
innovation, nor are the best instrument to maximizes inventors’
revenue. Patents create a market in patents and in the legal and
technical services required to trade and enforce them.
3.5 Patents and Innovation in the 20
th Century
A number of studies have attempted to examine whether
introducing or strengthening patent protection leads to greater
innovation using data from post WWII advanced economies. We
have identified twenty three economic studies that have examined
this issue empirically.
17 The executive summary: they find weak or
no evidence that strengthening patent regimes increases
innovation; they find strong evidence that strengthening the patent
regime increases … patenting! They also find evidence that, in
countries with initially weak IP regimes, strengthening IP increases
the flow of foreign investment in sectors where patents are
frequently used.
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www.cms.hhs.gov.14
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Authors Years Country Industry
Arora et al [2003] 1990-2002 U.S. Many
Arundel Many Many Many
Baldwin and Hanel 1993 Canada Many
Bessen and Hunt 1980-1996 U.S. Software
Branstetter and Sakakibara 1988-1998 Japan Many
Gallini 1980s U.S. Many
Hall and Ham 1980-1994 U.S. Semiconductor
Hall an Zeidonis 1979-1995 U.S. Semiconductor
Jaffe Many Many Many
Kanwar and Evenson 1981-1990 Many Aggregate
Kortum and Lerner 1980-2000 U.S. Many
Lanjouw 1990s India Pharmaceutical
Lanjouw and Cockburn 1975-1996 India Pharmaceutical
Leger 1978-2000 Mexico Agriculture
Lerner-1 1850-2000 Many Many
Lerner-2 1971-2000 U.S. Financial
Levine and Saunders 1981-2001 U.S. Software
Licht and Zoz 1992 Germany Many
Lo c. 1986 Taiwan Many
Mann 1900-2002 U.S. Software
Park 1987-1995 OECD Many
Qian 1979-1999 Many Pharmaceutical
Sakakibara and Branstetter 1988-1995 Japan Many
Scherer and Weisbrod 1970s Italy Pharmaceutical
The authors who find the strongest effect on innovation of
increased patent protection are Kanwar and Evenson, and Lo. The
latter examines the 1986 reform in Taiwan, while the former use
time series data from a cross section of countries to regress R&D
as a fraction of GDP on various variables including a qualitative
measure of IP protection. Both sets of results are worth examining
a bit more closely than the rest.
Lo finds increased innovation by Taiwanese inventors as
measured by R&D expenditure and by the number of U.S. patents
they were awarded. However, given the worldwide surge in U.S.
patents about this time and the fact that the number of Taiwanese
patents awarded to these same inventors did not much increase, we
can neither reliably conclude that the effect of the 1986 law was an
increase in innovation, nor a jump in aggregate or sectorial
productivity. What the reform certainly did, and Lo documents this15
15
convincingly, was to increase the number of patents awarded to
Taiwanese firms, especially in the U.S., which is altogether not
surprising. Lo himself points out that the main channel through
which the Taiwanese reform had a positive effect was by fostering
foreign direct investment in Taiwan especially in those sectors in
which patents are widely used.
This is an important point, which deserves a separate
comment. In a world in which strong patent protection in some
countries co-exists with weak protection in others, a country that
increases patent protection should observe an increase in the
inflow of foreign investment, especially in those sectors where
patented technologies are used. Profit maximizing entrepreneurs
always choose to operate in those legal environments where their
rights are the strongest. In the U.S., for example, economists and
people with common sense alike, have long argued that the policy
of offering tax incentives and subsidies to companies that relocate
in one state or another is not a good policy for the United States as
a whole. Nobody denies that, if you provide a company with high
enough subsidies and tax incentives, it will probably take them and
relocate to your state, at least temporarily. The problem is that,
after you do so, other states will respond by doing the same, or
more. In the ensuing equilibrium, the total amount of investment is
roughly the same as when no one was offering a subsidy, but
everyone is now paying a distorting tax to finance the subsidy.
When capital moves freely across countries, the very same logic
applies to the international determination of IP rights. In what
economists call the Nash Equilibrium of this game, it is obvious
that patent holders prefer to locate in countries with strong IP laws.
This increases the stock of capital in the receiving country and
reduces it everywhere else, especially in countries with low IP
protection. Hence, absent international cooperation, the strong
incentive of most countries to keep increasing patent protection,
even in the absence of lobbying and bribing by intellectual
monopolists.
As for the study by Kanwar and Evanson, they have data on
31 countries for the period 1981-1990. Using two 5 year averages
they find support for the idea that higher protection leads to higher
R&D as a fraction of GDP. Their measures of IP protection do not
always seem to make sense, but this is not the proper place to
engage in a statistical debate. There are five levels of IP protection
and R&D as a fraction of GDP ranges from a ten year average of
.231% in Jordan to 2.822% in Sweden. They find that increasing IP
by one level raises R&D as a fraction of GDP between 0.6% to16
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1.0%. As before, the most favorable interpretation of this result is
that countries offering higher levels of IP protection also attract
investments in those sectors in which R&D and patents are most
relevant. A less favorable interpretation of this result, instead,
points out that Kanwar and Evenson have forgotten to include a
main determinant of the ratio of R&D to GDP: that is, market size
as measured by GDP. The most elementary theory of innovation,
either under competition or under monopoly, shows that the
innovative effort is increasing in the size of the market, and that
large and rich countries will invest a larger share of their GDP in
R&D compared with small and poor countries. Putting Kanwar and
Evanson’s data together with GDP data from the 1990 CIA World
Fact Book, we find that a 1% increase in the size of a country as
measured by GDP increases the ratio of R&D to GDP by 0.34%.
It is interesting to looks at the residual error that is left over
after we predict the ratio of (the logarithm of) R&D to GDP from
(the logarithm of) GDP. Sorted by IP level we find






What does this show? The question is whether increasing
the IP level leads to an increase in the residual. Moving from level
0 to 1 and from level 1 to level 2 this is true, but not moving from
2 to 3 or 3 to 4. In other words, once you control for market size,
higher IP protection increases the R&D/GDP ratio at the very low
levels, but becomes uncorrelated with the R&D/GDP ratio at any
level of IP protection equal to 2 or more in the Kanwar and
Evenson scale. This reinforces the idea that what we are seeing is
primarily the effect of foreign investment. Among poor countries
with low IP protection, increases bring in more foreign investment
and raise R&D. In richer countries with high levels of IP, foreign
investment is not an issue, and increases in IP have little or no
effect on innovation.
3.6 Data Bases
The case of databases is still an experiment in the making,
or at least it was until about five years ago. Unusually enough, the17
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U.S. is, at least for now, on the right side of the divide. Databases,
it seems obvious, have become increasingly important for private
individuals, businesses, academic researchers, industrial R&D and,
unfortunately, also for national security.
The experiment-in-the-making and the intense debate
accompanying it, both began in 1996. On March 11, the European
Union issued a directive requiring member states to provide
statutory protection of data-bases on the basis of copyright, even if
the data base in question contained material that was not itself
under copyright. The E.U. also tried to force nonmember states to
accept its directive. It did this by deciding that EU protection
would be extended to their citizens only if the nonmember states
provided similar protection. By 2001 all EU countries had fully
implemented the EU directive.
Which one do you think is higher: The rate of creation of
databases in the E.U. – where they are protected by IP – or in the
U.S. – where they are not?  Well, you guessed right: in the U.S. In
fact, it is not even a race, the U.S. wins hands down, as Block
points out. After documenting in details the excellent state of the
database industry in the U.S., its amazing growth rate and
productivity as well as the fact that the adoption of the directive
does not seem to have produced any sustained increase in the
E.U.’s production of databases, Block adds
For the entire period measured, U.S. online database
production outpaced all of Europe by a factor of nearly
2.5:1 ... American dominance of database production
cannot be explained by incentives given to creators because
American protection of database rights is much weaker
than the Directive.
18
To which we only add that, most probably, American dominance
of the industry can be explained by economic incentives to creators
as measured by the actual profits accruing to them and by the
competitive environment in which they operate, and that, almost
certainly, neither of them is increased much by the EU Directive.
4. Abolition
Defenders of intellectual monopoly like to portray
intellectual property as a powerful and beneficial medicine. If a
                                                
18 Block [2000], p. 7.18
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medicine has serious side effects and scientific studies have found
at best weak evidence of temporary benefits, would you employ
such a drug on an otherwise healthy patient? Probably not, unless
the illness was life threatening. Yet we have documented that
innovation thrives in the absence of intellectual monopoly (the
patient is healthy), that the latter has serious side effects (the evils
of intellectual monopoly) and that a series of scientific studies have
found weak or no evidence that it increases innovation (the
proposed beneficial effect is probably absent).
“On the basis of the present knowledge” progressively but
effectively abolishing intellectual property protection is the only
socially responsible thing to do.  Evidence has accumulated during
the last fifty years leaving little doubt about the damaging effects
of current intellectual property laws. At the same time, legal,
economic, and business know-how has also accumulated about
how markets for innovation operates without intellectual
monopoly. To rule out abolition a priori would be no more
sensible now than it would have been to rule out the abolition of
tariffs and trade barriers fifty years ago, when the trade
liberalization process that has given us prosperity and globalization
began. For a long time, the individuals and firms that profited from
trade barriers argued that these increased the wealth of the nation,
defended homeland companies and jobs, and that abolishing them
would lead to a disaster for many sectors of our economy. It took a
while to realize this was not true, and that trade barriers were
nothing more than rent-seeking devices, favoring a minority and
dramatically hurting the overall economy and everyone else,
beginning with low income consumers. The same is now true of
patents and copyright.
Which leads us to address, albeit very briefly, another
concern raised by Mark Lemley in his contribution: that we grossly
overstate the positive impact that competition may have had, or
would have, on innovative activity. Again, this may well be true,
but there is no empirical evidence whatsoever in the literature that
this is the case. In our book we provide dozens of examples of
competitive industries that are highly innovative and are so
because they are open to free entry and competition. The list goes
from the very important in terms of GNP (software at its origin or
the financial industry until now or the whole of agriculture until
the 1970s) to the somewhat secondary or even marginal (the
pornography industry and fashion design) or, why not, our own
industry: academic research is based and thrives on open
competition. Our critics, we insist, may well be right but the19
19
burden of the proof is now on their shoulders. It is up to them to
prove, with data and facts, that our examples are distorted or
irrelevant or special. Until that is done we can only remind the
reader that, for various centuries, the very same negative and
dismissive evaluation of the power of competition had been
opposed to advocate of free trade. The last century and a half are
there to prove who was right and who was wrong.
Therefore, while waiting for an empirical proof that
competition harms innovation or fosters it very little, let us move
on to the main issue: is it worth advocating the abolition of patents
and copyright? Scientific studies of the current system agree that it
is badly broken. Getting rid of it may therefore be a good idea.
Still, one should pause. Realizing that intellectual monopoly may
be akin to cancer, we recognize that simply cutting it all out at
once poses problems. Since intellectual property laws have been
around for a long while, we have learned to live with them. A
myriad of other legal and informal institutions, business practices
and professional skills have grown up around them and in
symbiosis with them. Consequently, a sudden elimination of
intellectual property laws may bring about collateral damages of an
intolerable magnitude.
What this example suggests is that abolition must be
approached by smaller steps, and that the sequencing of steps
matters. Gradual reform is necessary both because of the need for
other institutions, to reform in parallel, and also because it is a
political necessity. The number of people prospering thanks to
intellectual monopoly is large and growing. While some of them,
such as movie stars, have accrued much wealth, for many others
this is not the case. For many ordinary people intellectual
monopoly has become another way of earning a living and, while
most of them would be able to earn an equally good or even better
living without it, many others need time to adjust. Further, and
again in analogy with trade barriers, while the number of people
who would benefit from the elimination of intellectual monopoly is
large and growing, the gain each one of them perceives as likely is
small. In spite of the brouhaha surrounding the “pirating” of
popular music and movies, the direct personal saving from
copyright reduction or even abolition would not be substantial as
music, movies and books are a tiny share of household
consumption. In the case of medicines and software, consumers’
potential saving may be more substantial but harder to perceive.
Finally, and most importantly, if in the 1950s or 1960s the average
citizen of the world could hardly forecast the tremendous20
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improvement in her standard of living that free trade would have
brought about within thirty years, even harder it is now to perceive
the incremental technological advances that a progressive
elimination of intellectual monopoly could bring about in a couple
of decades.
In summary, dismantling our intellectual property system
poses a set of circumstances that the literature on collective action
has identified as major barriers to reform. A few, well-organized
and coordinated monopolists on the one side are bound to lose a lot
if the protective barriers are lifted. A very large number of
uncoordinated consumers on the other side, would receive very
small personal gains from the adoption of freer competition. For a
long time then, the battleground is going to be one of competing
ideas and theories aimed at convincing public opinion that
substantial gains are possible from the elimination of intellectual
monopoly. In the mean time, there is a vast array of ideas both for
greatly expanding intellectual property and, in the opposite
direction, for useful reform. In this, our concluding, chapter, we try
to sort these proposals into the bad, the good, and the just plain
ugly.
5. Bad Policy
Despite the fact that our system of intellectual property is
badly broken, there are those who seek to break it even further.
The first priority must be to stem the tide of rent-seekers
demanding ever greater privilege. Within the United States and
Europe, there is a continued effort to expand the scope of
innovations subject to patent, to extend the length of copyright, and
to impose ever more draconian penalties for intellectual property
violation. Internationally, the United States – as a net exporter of
ideas – has been negotiating dramatic increases in protection of
U.S. intellectual monopolists as part of free trade agreements.
There seems to be no end to the list of bad proposals for
strengthening intellectual monopoly. To give a partial (and dated,
as it was last compiled in 2007 and we do not have here the
opportunity to update it) list starting with the least significant
￿  Extend the scope of patent to include sports moves and plays.
19
                                                
19 To the best of our knowledge, the first published statement of this proposal is
in Kukkonen [1998], but a quick search on Google shows the idea is receiving
lots of attention from interested lawyers and law firms, see  Das [2000],
http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/update1022.html.21
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￿  Extend the scope of copyright to include news clips, press
releases and so forth.
20
￿  Allow for patenting of story lines – something the U.S. Patent
Office just did by awarding a patent to Andrew Knight for his
“The Zombie Stare” invention.
21
￿  Extend the level of protection copyright offers to databases,
along the lines of the 1996 E.U. Database Directive, and of the
subsequent WIPO’s Treaty proposal.
22
￿  Extend the scope of copyright and patents to the results of
scientific research, including that financed by public funds;
something already partially achieved with the Bayh-Dole Act.
23
￿  Extend the length of copyright in Europe to match that in the
U.S. – which is most ironic, as the sponsors of the CTEA and
the DMCA in the USA claimed they were necessary to match
... new and longer European copyright terms.
24
￿  Extend the set of circumstances in which “refusal to license” is
allowed and enforced by anti-trust authorities. More generally,
turn around the 1970’s Antitrust Division wisdom that lead to
the so called “Nine No-No’s” to licensing practices. Previous
wisdom correctly saw such practices as anticompetitive
restraints of trade in the licensing business. Persistent and
successful, lobbying from the beneficiaries of intellectual
monopoly has managed to turn the table around, portraying
such monopolistic practices as “necessary” or even “vital”
ingredients for a well functioning patents’ licensing market.
25
                                                
20 As in the Spanish case of Gedeprensa.
21 The recent extension of patents to story lines is discussed in
www.emediawire.com/releases/2005/11/emw303435.htm. For a, more than
sympathetic but highly revealing in its biasedness, legal “analysis” of the whole
idea of patenting plots, visit http://www.plotpatents.com/legal_analysis.htm,
which comes directly from the law firm that worked hard to patent fictional
plots.
22 As we discussed in Chapter 8 of our book and references therein.
23 There is no need for references here, still here is one to an old and rather
interesting case of University research patenting, Apple [1989].
24 Again, material abounds on the web and the regular press about the ongoing
debate to extend the EU copyright term to match the current extended US term.
To start, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/music/3547788.stm. For a
piece by Dennis Karjala on EU-US harmonization see
http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/legmats/
HarmonizationChartDSK.html.
25 See http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/chapter_1.pdf for a relatively
technical discussion of the issues involved in the “unilateral refusal to licensing”
practice. For a list of the “Nine No-No’s”, and a not unbiased discussion of the
opportunity to dispose of them, clearly favoring the disposal option, see Gilbert
and Shapiro [1997]. For a very different view, cogently applied to the two recent
Microsoft antitrust cases, see First [2006].22
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￿  Establish, as a relatively recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling in
the case of Verizon vs Trinko did, that legally acquired
monopoly power and its use to charge higher prices is not only
admissible, it “is an important element of the free-market
system” because “it induces innovation and economic growth.”
￿  Impose legal restrictions on the design of computers forcing
them to “protect” intellectual property.
26
￿  Make producers of software used in P2P exchanges directly
liable for any copyright violation carried out with the use of
their software, something that may well be in the making after
the Supreme Court ruling in the Grokster case.
27
￿  Allow the patenting of computer software in Europe – this we
escaped, momentarily, due to a sudden spark of rationality by
the European Parliament.
28
￿  Allow the patenting of any kind of plant variety outside of the
United States, where it is already allowed.
29
￿  Allow for generalized patenting of genomic products outside of
the United States, where it is already allowed.
30
                                                
26 Information and news about the Digital Rights Management (DRM) initiative
(in its multiple versions) and its very controversial nature are widespread on the
web and on other media. The curious reader may want to begin with the relative
Wikipedia entry and then continue from there.
27 For detailed information about the Grokster case, Wikipedia is again  a good
starting point, while additional info can be found at the Electronic Frontier
Foundation page on MGM v. Grokser. A middle-of-the-road legal assessment is
in Samuelson [2004]. For the sad effect of the Supreme Court ruling on
economic innovation, go to www.grokster.com and read the scary message
welcoming you.
28 On July 2, 2005 the European Parliament voted 648 to 14 (18 abstensions) to
scrap the so-called “Directive on the Patentability of Computer Implemented
Inventions.” While this was good news, the battle on software patents in Europe
is far from over. The vote is attributable more to a general fight with the EU
Commission, tending to ignore whatever the European Parliament suggests, than
to a widespread opposition to software patents within the latter body. In the
meanwhile, though, grassroots opposition has grown and, especially within the
business community, a variety of action groups have sprung up that oppose
software patents along pro-business lines and on the basis of pro-free market
arguments such as those exposed in this book.
29 News and information on this topic are widespread through all kinds of media.
The FAO on-line Forum on Biotechnlogy in Food and Agriculture, at
http://www.fao.org/biotech/forum.asp, is a particularly informative starting point
for the interested reader. A number of reasonable reforms that would improve
the developing countries’ situation in the agricultural sector can be found at
http://issues.org/17.4/barton.htm.
30 Having abundantly clarified why genomic patents are a bad idea,  references
to people liking them for misguided reasons are Putnam [2004] and Hale et al.
[2006].23
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￿  Force other countries, especially developing countries, to
impose the same draconian intellectual property laws as the
U.S., the E.U. and Japan.
31
Why these are bad ideas should be self-evident by now – and all
should be rejected.
Developing countries in particular should be wary of
negotiating away their intellectual freedom in exchange for greater
access to U.S. and E.U. markets. Developing countries are, slowly
but surely, giving in to the U.S. and E.U. pressure and modifying
their national legislation in accordance with the requirements
imposed by TRIPS and the WIPO. This is partly the effect of sheer
lobbying and political pressure by Western governments and large
multinationals. Partly, this is also due to the lack of a workable and
coherent alternative to the over-reaching redesign of world
intellectual property rights underlying TRIPS and its ideology.
This trend makes an open and critical debate on such themes in
developing countries even more urgent and valuable than it would
be in any case.
6. Good Policy
There are a great many things that can be done to make
modest improvements in the current system of both patents and
copyrights. In the case of patents there are a variety of proposals
for making the patent system less vulnerable to “submarine”
patenting, and generally tightening up the system so that a patent
has some real connection to innovation, and is not merely a claim
to someone else’s invention. In the case of copyright, a major
priority is to make sure that all the abandoned and orphaned works
do not forever remain unusable because they are under copyright,
and the copyright holder is dead, has disappeared or is in any case
untraceable.
For both patents and copyright, a fundamental priority is to
prevent the public domain from shrinking further, and, when
possible, push back the fences that are progressively enclosing it.
This means, on the one hand, opposing new proposals for the
extension of copyright term and coverage beyond those established
by the 1998 Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA) and
                                                
31 This being the main, if not the only, reason behind the existence of TRIPS-
WTO, as is easily verified from the documents contained on the TRIPS web site
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_e.htm.24
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Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA). On the other hand, it also
means to take proactive actions to defend from rapacious hands
what is growing in the public domain and needs to be nurtured.
Private economic initiative can be extremely useful along this
dimension and the recent Open Innovation Network initiative, led
by IBM, is a wonderful case in point.
32
Jaffe and Lerner document in great detail how the patent
system, as it is currently implemented in the U.S., is broken.
33
They make numerous proposals to make frivolous patents more
difficult to get and enforce. We support these proposals in
principle – and while we might disagree over some of the details,
we expect that were we to debate the matter, they would convince
us on some points, and we would convince them on others.
One proposal in particular, is to allow patents to be
challenged before they are granted. This would allow real evidence
to be brought to bear on the issue of prior art – something the U.S.
Patent Office seems to know little about, as the thousands of “how
to swing a swing” and “peanut-butter and jelly sandwiches”
patents suggest.
34 Realistically, however, few individuals or firms
would be likely to monitor the patent system carefully enough to
identify bad patents, or to incur the expense of providing the public
good of challenging bad patents. Quillen et al
35examine the rigor
with which the U.S. Patent Office carries out its examining
activities and compare it to those of the European and Japanese
Patent Offices. They take the opposite approach from Lerner and
Jaffe, suggesting that the patent office is not the appropriate place
                                                
32 Information about the IBM and other companies’ protective patent pool on
Linux is widespread through the web and other media. Visit Wikipedia under
OSDL and Free Standards group to learn more, or go directly to the sites of the
OIN, http://www.openinventionnetwork.com and of the Linux Foundation
http://www.linux-foundation.org/en/Main_Page.
33 A detailed discussion of possible, and all very reasonable, reforms can be
found in Jaffe and Lerner [2004].
34 Obviously, the “how to swing a swing” patent (United States Patent 6368227)
is here just a label for a gigantic, and ever growing, class of patents that are so
logically unfounded that one may think we fabricated the whole thing. Well, we
must admit that we do not have the level of imagination needed to reach the
heights achieved by the USPTO in cooperation with some of the most shameless
rent-seekers in the world. For entertaining surveys of this modern set of legal
monstrosities, out of an almost endless list of sites, the following few:
www.freepatentsonline.com/crazy.html, www.crazypatents.com,
www.totallyabsurd.com, www.patentlysilly.com should keep you amused if not
frightened.
35 Quillen et al [2002].25
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to reach decisions concerning patentability. They conclude by
asking
...why should we not go to a registration system and avoid
the expenses of operating an examination system …
shouldn’t we abolish continuing applications so that the
USPTO will be able to obtain final decisions as to the
patentability of subject matter presented in patent
applications and avoid having rework imposed upon it.
Finally, so long as the USPTO grants a patent for virtually
every application filed, are the courts justified in adhering
to the clear and convincing evidence standard for
overcoming the statutory presumption of validity?
36
It is striking but true that either of these proposals, although they
go in opposite directions, would be an improvement over the
current system. That speaks volumes about how bad the current
system is: mathematicians call it a “global minimum” a position
such that any movement away from it, in any direction, improves
things. This is another such case.
Also of great significance is the proposal of Gallini and
Scotchmer to allow the “independent invention” defense to patent
claims
37. That is, they would allow proof that an invention was
independently derived, and not obtained directly or indirectly as a
consequence of the similar invention that was patented first, as a
defense against patent infringement. For example, if you patented
the “one-click” with the mouse to past text into a word processor,
and sued me because my word processor also pasted text with just
one click, I could defend myself by showing that I had written my
word processor in my spare time and had never read your patent,
or seen a copy of your word processor. This would not only relieve
the innovator from concern that in his ignorance he would run
afoul of some existing patent, it would also make it substantially
more difficult to engage in submarine warfare, as the inventor who
is torpedoed by the submarine could argue, and prove, that his
invention was independent. This reform, alone, would be of great
social value and would enormously reduce the burden of
intellectual monopoly. As we have illustrated repeatedly,
simultaneous or independent inventions are almost the rule in the
                                                
36 Quillem et al [2002], pp. 50-51.
37 Gallini and Scotchmer [2001].26
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creative process, rather than the exception. For many great
inventions of the last century – the radio, the TV, the airplane, the
telephone – allowing the two or more independent and
simultaneous inventors to both exploit their invention
commercially would have greatly benefited consumers and
economic progress in general. This is even more true and more
relevant today, as the number of judicial disputes over practically
identical and simultaneous innovations skyrockets, especially in
the fields of software, biomedical products and telecomunications,
and for business practices in general.
An alternative reform would be to require mandatory
licensing at fees based on estimates of R&D costs. The principle is
the following: if it costs $100 to invent a gadget, 10% is a
reasonable rate of return on this type of investment, and expected
demand for licensing is in the order of 100 units, then a net present
value fee of $1.10 would be right. If the cost of uncertainty is an
additional five cents we should set mandatory licensing fee at
$1.15 for this particular patent. William Kingston takes a more
serious look at how this might work in practice, particularly
figuring a multiplier to account for the many failed innovations
needed to produce a successful one. Kingston points out that cost
estimates are already widely used in patent litigation and are not so
difficult to produce and document. He estimates that, for most of
the cases he studied, the total revenue from licensing products that
are successfully patented and licensed should be about eight times
their R&D cost, if the license is taken immediately; for licenses
issued as the products actually go to market, a multiplier of four
would be more appropriate. In the case of pharmaceuticals, he
suggests a multiple of two would be sufficient – noting that
If three such licenses were taken, the payments would
[already] put the product into the most profitable decile
(the home of the blockbuster drugs).
38
A backdoor to reducing the term of patent, and making it
less easy to accidentally run afoul of long-standing but
meaningless patents, would be to reintroduce patent renewal – for
example, keeping the term of patent fixed, while splitting the
twenty year term into smaller increments, with a renewal required
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at each stage. This is discussed by Cornelli and Schankerman and
by Scotchmer.
39
In copyright, the most immediate problem is that of an
Administration, a Congress and a Supreme Court that are “bought
and paid for.” The triple whammy of giving automatic copyright to
every work, whether or not it is registered, eliminating the need for
renewal, and extending the term of copyright to be essentially
infinite means that, over time, virtually everything written will
become inaccessible. The Obama Admnistration is now taking care
of spreading this gospel around the world by placing such issues as
“getting tough on pirates” at the top of its diplomatic agenda.
Lessig
40, among others, documents in great detail the problems
caused by these “ugly reforms.” He proposes that some of the ill-
effect could be undone by a modest renewal fee. Landes and
Posner
41 suggest that the legal principle of abandonment could be
applied to copyright holders who do not actively make it clear that
they are maintaining their copyright. Either or both of these
proposals – however politically naïve they might be – would be a
great improvement over the current situation.
The debacle we currently face in copyright is that as more
and more draconian laws concerning copyright are introduced, less
and less real copyright protection is possible, as it has proven
impossible to police the P2P networks in any realistic sense. Many
have suggested that the way out of this dilemma is through
mandatory licensing. Radio broadcasters currently pay a fixed fee,
but do not require special permission to broadcast a song. In the
same way, downloads could be made legal and payments to
copyright holders based on the number of times a song is
downloaded. This is not a perfect proposal – the possibility of
manipulating the “download ratings” comes to mind, and the
mandatory licensing fee for internet radio was set untenably high –
but on balance, would probably serve to improve the current
situation.
The recent, and widely advertised if limited, decisions by
Apple and EMI to renounce policing P2P file sharing via
technological means (that is, by giving up on DRM)  is also a
positive step. It signals that at least a few among the big players are
realizing that the “technological police” approach is a losing
                                                
39 Patent renewal schemes are discussed in Cornelli and Schankerman [1999]
and Scotchmer [1999].
40 Lessig [2004]. See especially the chapter “Registration and Renewal” in the
public domain version at http://www.authorama.com.
41 Landes and Posner [2003].28
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business proposition, and that plenty of money can be made by
selling downloadable music that consumers can then share and
redistribute more or less freely.
42
7. Subsides for Innovation and Creation
It is theoretically possible that the competitive market alone
provides insufficient incentive to innovate – although, as we
already said, there is no evidence that this is the case. Suppose that
we succeed in abolishing intellectual monopoly and discover, after
a few years, that there is less innovation than would be socially
desirable. Unlikely as this event may be, we as economists must
nevertheless consider it. Hence, should we reintroduce intellectual
monopoly in this case?
Intellectual property law is about the government enforcing
private monopolies. In countries without effective tax collection
mechanisms, both historically and currently, government grants of
monopolies were and are commonplace; we all have seen some old
label for a tea or chocolate brand reporting “By Appointment of
Her Majesty.” As nations develop, more effective tax collection
infrastructures have been replacing such revenue devices as the salt
monopoly, or the grant of exclusive import rights to the brother-in-
law of the president. Hence, the sale by government officials of
exclusive rights to carry out this or the other commercial activity
or to produce and commercialize certain goods and services have
progressively disappeared in almost all advanced market
economies. Intellectual property is one of the few remaining
anachronisms from the pre-history of modern tax collection, worse,
indeed: it is a distorted anachronism that is now being exploited for
rent-seeking purposes that are opposite to those for which it was
originally established. The answer is that – if there is indeed a need
for extra incentives – it should be done through subsidization and
not through government grants of monopoly.
A first question might be what level of subsidy would
replace the profits of the current monopolists?
43 Schankerman
44
                                                
42 Mildly good legal news seem also to be coming from the European courts,
which have started to rule against some of the most preposterous requests to
treat any form of music downloading as theft, even when intended only for
personal use and with no commercial purposes. For the Spanish and Italian court





makes the calculation that a subsidy to R&D of 15%-35% would
be enough to provide an incentive equivalent to that currently
provided by patents – ironically subsidies of nearly this level are
already available in addition to patents, especially in the
pharmaceutical industry, as we documented in the previous
chapter. Indeed, the offensive sight of the government using
taxpayers’ money to subsidize research and then awarding it a
private monopoly reaches absurd heights in academia, where in
recent years the mantra of “private-public partnership” has taken
hold. A more egregious form of public subsidy for private
monopolies is hard to imagine.
Like monopolies, subsidies can lead to rent-seeking and
have distortionary effects, so they should scarcely be a first resort.
Some economists, such as Paul Romer, painfully aware of these
negative side-effects, have proposed to avoid some of these
distortions by narrowly targeted subsidies – for example to
graduate students who, the evidence suggests, are key instruments
in the process of innovation. Others, such as Andreas Irmen and
Martin Hellwig, suggest that broad subsides to investment in
general – interest rate subsidies, for example – are likely to be the
least distortionary. Yet others, such as Michael Kremer, suggest
that prizes awarded after the fact create greater incentives to
innovate. Nancy Gallini and Suzanne Scotchmer go further and
compare various subsidization methods in their recent work. Their
technical analysis is beyond the scope of this book, but the basic
point remains: various intelligent forms of subsidizing basic
research and even applied invention exist, and an appropriate mix
                                                                                                            
43 Schankerman and Pakes [1986] have studied patent returns in various
European countries. Using their data, Kingston [2001] estimates the subsidies
that would be required to replace the current patent system (p. 18)
Schankerman and Pakes reported that for patents in Britain, France and
Germany, the returns appear to be only a small fraction of the domestic R&D
expenditure of the business enterprises.  The means of the discounted sum of
rewards from patent age 5 were about $7,000 in Britain and France and
$19,000 in Germany. The value of patents as a proportion of total national R&D
expenditure was 0.057 in France, 0.068 in Britain and 0.056 in Germany (1986,
pp. 1068, 1074). Schankerman subsequently estimated that a subsidy to R&D of
15%-35% would be enough to provide an equivalent incentive to patents (1988,
p. 95).
44 Schankerman [1998]. Notice that this is the same paper referred to by
Kingston in the quotation reported in the previous note; 1988 is clearly a typo in
Kingston’s working paper.30
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Whether the Disney Corporation will get to continue their
monopoly of Mickey Mouse does not seem like an issue that
should lead either to revolt or non-violent insurrection. But have
no doubt – intellectual monopoly threatens both our prosperity and
our freedom and to strangle innovation all together.
This might seem an exaggerated statement, made only to
stir controversy – and sell a few more copies of our copyrighted
book. Yet, despite the fact that by 1433 the great Chinese explorer
Cheng Ho’s fleets had explored Africa and the Middle East
46, in
the subsequent centuries the world was colonized by Europeans
and not by the Chinese. The monopolists of the Ming Dynasty saw
a threat to their monopoly – which was then a monopoly of
intellectual and administrative power – in the innovative
explorations of Cheng Ho and forced him to stop. This lead to a
static, inward looking and regressive regime, where Emperors
ruled under mottos such as “stay the course” and “do nothing”, and
where innovation and progress not only faltered, but were
progressively replaced by obsolescence, regression, and,
eventually, poverty. And so it is that in the United States we
celebrate Christopher Columbus day, rather than Cheng Ho day.
At a smaller scale, but with a no less real impact on world
history, we find that intellectual property has delayed the
development of the steam engine, the automobile, the airplane, and
innumerable other useful things. This took place at a time before
the United States became the sole dominant world power, and
before a system nearly as noxious as the current system in the
United States and the European Union was in place. It took place
during a time when very many countries were still competing for
world primacy, and the collusive pact among intellectual
monopolists that our modern trade agreements have been built to
enforce, was not in the cards. If the Wright brothers preferred
litigation to invention, at least the French were free to develop the
airplane. If Gottlieb Daimler and Karl Benz were the first to build
a practical automobile powered by an internal-combustion engine,
                                                
45 See, respectively, Romer [1996], Hellwig and Irmen [2001], Kremer
[2001a,b] and Glennerster, Kremer and Williams [2006], Gallini and Scotchmer
[2001].
46 To start learning about him, see, for example,
http://famousmuslims.muslimonline.org/zheng-he-cheng-ho.html.31
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their German patent did not prevent John Lambert, only six years
later, from developing America’s first gasoline-powered
automobile. Nor did it prevent the Duryea Brothers, shortly after,
from founding America’s first company to manufacture and sell
gasoline-powered vehicles.
47
 Where, today, is a software innovator to find safe haven
from Microsoft’s lawyers? Where, tomorrow, will be the
pharmaceutical companies that will challenge the patents of “big
pharma” and produce drugs and vaccines for the millions dying in
Africa and elsewhere? Where, today, are courageous publishers,
committed to the idea that accumulated knowledge should be
widely available, defending the Google Book Search initiative?
Nowhere, as far as we can tell, and this is a bad omen for the times
to come. The legal and political war between the innovators and
the monopolists is a real one, and the innovators may not win as
the forces of “Stay the Course” and “Do Nothing” are powerful,
and on the rise.
Certainly the basic threat to prosperity and liberty can be
resolved through sensible reform. But intellectual property is a
cancer. The goal must be not merely to make the cancer more
benign, but ultimately to get rid of it entirely. So, while we are
skeptical of the idea of immediately and permanently eliminating
intellectual monopoly – the long-term goal should be no less than a
complete elimination. A phased reduction in the length of terms of
both patents and copyrights would be the right place to start. By
gradually reducing terms, it becomes possible to make the
necessary adjustments – for example to FDA regulations,
publishing techniques and practices, software development and
distribution methods – while at the same time making a
commitment to eventual elimination.
Given that it may well be the case that some modest degree
of intellectual monopoly is superior to complete abolition – why do
we set as a goal complete elimination of intellectual property? Our
position on intellectual monopoly is not different from the position
most economists take on trade restrictions: although some modest
amount of protection might be desirable in special cases, it is more
practical and useful to focus on the elimination of restrictions as a
general rule. Similarly, while some modest amount of intellectual
                                                
47 Apart for two small entries on Wikipedia and a few other small sites, there is
little on the web about either John Lambert or the Duryea Brothers. Still, by
searching and reading carefully, their stories and their achievements do emerge
slowly but surely. Neither of them took out a patent, but their innovative actions
started the American automobile industry nevertheless. See Scharchburg [1993].32
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monopoly might be desirable in very special cases, it is more
practical and useful to focus on the elimination of intellectual
monopoly as a general rule. In innovation as in trade, a modest
degree of monopoly is not sustainable. Once the lobbyist’s nose is
inside the tent, the entire lobby is sure to follow, and we will once
again be faced with a broken patent system and absurdly long
copyright terms. To secure our prosperity and freedom we must
abolish intellectual monopoly from the tent entirely. To do so we
must develop the very same patient determination with which we
have been after trade restrictions for more than half a century, and
we are not done yet.
This analogy between intellectual property and trade
restrictions is not a purely rhetorical tool, nor a random
comparison. For centuries, human innovative activity took the
form of creating new consumption goods, new machines and new
staples of food. But the transmission of ideas from one producer to
another and across countries was not nearly as fast, standardized,
and routinized as it is today. Creative human activity was focused
on the creation and reproduction of physical goods and not on the
creation and reproduction of ideas. Free trade of commodities was
therefore key in fostering progress: the more competitors entered
the market with shoes like yours, the more you had to improve on
your shoes to keep selling them.
This dialectic we used to call economic progress, and, after
a few centuries of intellectual debate and numerous wars, Western
societies came to understand that restricting international trade was
damaging because protectionism prevents economic progress and
fosters international tensions leading to conflict. Since at least the
late Middle Ages, the battle has been between the forces of
progress, individual freedom, competition and free trade, and those
of stagnation, regulation of individual actions, monopoly, and trade
protection. Now that the intellectual and political battle over free
trade of physical goods seems won, and an increasing number of
less advanced countries are joining the progressive ranks of free-
trading nations, pressure for making intellectual property
protection stronger is mounting in those very same countries that
advocate free trade. This is not coincidence.
Most physical goods already are and, in the decades to
come, will increasingly be, produced in less developed countries.
Most innovations and creations are taking place in the advanced
world, and the IT and bio-engineering revolutions suggest this will
continue for a while at least. It is not surprising then, that a new
version of the eternal parasite of economic progress – mercantilism33
33
– is emerging in the rich countries of North America, Europe and
Asia.
Economic progress springs from having things produced as
efficiently as possible, so that they can sell at the lowest price. This
wisdom applies to both the things we buy and to those we sell, and
therein lies the trap of mercantilism. Most of us have learned that
the surest way to make a profit is to “buy cheap and sell dear.”
When there is adequate competition and everyone tries to buy
cheap and sell dear, then the only way I can buy cheap and sell
dear is for me to be more efficient than you. This generates
incentives for innovation and progress. The trap and tragedy of
mercantilism is when this individually correct philosophy is
transformed into a national policy: that we are all better off when
our country as a whole buys cheap and sells dear. It was this
myopic and distorted view of the way in which markets function
that Smith, Ricardo, and the classic economists were fighting
against 250 years ago. At that time wheat producers in England
wanted to restrict free trade in wheat so English producers could
sell it dear. That meant English consumers could not buy it cheap.
Now, before moving to the next paragraph, consider the current
debate about preventing “parallel imports” of medicines, CDs,
DVDs, and other products covered by intellectual monopoly. Do
you see a parallelism? That is our point.
The contemporary variation of this economic pest is one in
which our collective interest is, allegedly, best served if we buy
goods cheap and sell ideas dear. In the mind of those preaching
this new version of the mercantilist credo, the World Trade
Organization should enforce as much free trade as possible, so we
can buy “their” products at a low price. It should also protect our
“intellectual property” as much as possible, so we can sell “our”
movies, software, and medicines at a high price. What this folly
misses is that, now like three centuries ago, while it is good to buy
“their” food cheap, if “they” buy movies and medicines at high
prices, so do “we.” In fact, as the case of medicines and DVDs
prove, the monopolist sells to “us” at even higher prices than to
“them.” This has dramatic consequences on the incentives to
progress: when someone can sell at high prices because of legal
protection from imitators, they will not expend much effort looking
for better and cheaper ways of doing things.
For centuries, the cause of economic progress has been
identified with that of free trade. In the decades to come, sustaining
economic progress will depend, more and more, upon our ability to
progressively reduce and eventually eliminate intellectual34
34
monopoly. As in the battle for free trade, the first step must consist
in destroying the intellectual foundations of the obscurantist
position. Back then the mercantilist fallacy taught that, to become
wealthy, a country must regulate trade and strive for trade
surpluses. Today, the same fallacy teaches that without intellectual
monopoly innovations would be impossible and that our
governments should prohibit parallel import and enforce draconian
intellectual monopoly rules. We hope that we have made some
progress in demolishing that myth.35
35
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